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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WESTBURY ASSOCIATION OF 
ADMINISTRATORS AND SUPERVISORS, 
Charging Party, 
-and -
WESTBURY UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
ROBERT SAPERSTEIN, ESQ., for Charging Party 
JASPAN SCHLESINGER SILVERMAN & HOFFMAN, LLP (LAWRENCE J. 
TENENBAUM and JAY S. HELLMAN of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Westbury Association of 
Administrators and Supervisors (Association) to a decision by an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ). After a hearing, the ALJ dismissed the Association's charge against the 
Westbury Union Free School District (District) in which the Association alleges that the 
District violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
unilaterally changed its past practice concerning the reappointment of unit employees 
to positions held the year prior. Specifically, the Association alleges that the District 
improperly failed to reappoint its Director of Pupil Services, Dr. Mariann Berliner, as the 
principal for a 1997 summer school program for children with disabilities. 
CASE NO. U-19101 
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The ALJ held that the Association had not proven that the District had a practice 
of automatically reappointing unit employees to stipend positions if their prior year's 
service in that position was satisfactory. 
The Association argues that the ALJ's decision is not supported by the record 
and is contrary to-established case law. The District argues-in response-that-the ALJ's 
decision is correct as a matter of fact and law and should be affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' arguments, we affirm the 
ALJ's decision. 
The ALJ did not decide whether the subject of the District's alleged change is 
mandatorily negotiable because he held that there was no proven change in a past 
practice. Although each party has presented arguments as to the negotiability of job 
• ) 
retention rights, there is no need for us to decide that question. Even assuming that an 
employee's rights to reappointment to a position are mandatorily negotiable in any 
respect, the record does not establish that the District changed its practice when it did 
not reappoint Dr. Berliner as a principal in 1997. 
The entirety of the Association's argument that the District changed its practice 
rests on the proposition that a unit administrator holds an absolute right to 
reappointment to a stipend position automatically upon the employee's request, 
provided only that the employee has performed satisfactorily in that position. The ALJ 
found, however, that there was never a practice under which reappointment was 
automatic at the employee's demand. Rather, the ALJ found that the District's practice 
was to make appointments for one year at a time, with reappointment expressly 
conditioned upon the recommendation of the Superintendent of Schools 
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(Superintendent). The Superintendent did not recommend Dr. Berliner for 
reappointment to the principal's position. Instead, the Superintendent recommended 
another person, who was appointed. 
Although the Association argues that the ALJ's findings are not supported by the 
record; we concludeuponour review that the ALJ's"material findingsrof factare 
consistent with the record. There is nothing in the record, whether considered 
separately or collectively, to establish that the District's administrators, unlike the 
District's instructional staff, who have contractual reappointment rights, hold an absolute 
entitlement by practice to reappointment to stipend positions if their services are 
objectively satisfactory. All of the evidence relied upon by the Association, including a 
leave of absence granted Dr. Berliner from the principal's position, is fully consistent 
with a right of reappointment conditioned upon the Superintendent's affirmative 
recommendation, which cannot be regarded as meaningless or ministerial. The ALJ's 
legal conclusion that a practice conditional from inception cannot ripen into an 
unconditional practice simply by actions taken consistently with the condition is correct.1 
In dismissing this charge, we do not express any opinion as to Dr. Berliner's 
qualifications vis a vis any other employee or whether she was fairly considered for 
reappointment. Those are issues not relevant to our disposition of this charge. 
For the reasons set forth above, the Association's exceptions are denied and the 
ALJ's decision is affirmed. 
'E.g., Public Employees Fed'n v. PERB, 195 A.D.2d 930, 26 PERB 1J7008 (3d 
Dep't 1993); Schalmont Cent. Sen. Dist, 29 PERB 1J3036 (1996). 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: December 10, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BINGHAMTON FIREFIGHTERS, LOCAL 729, 
AFL-CIO, I.A.F.F., 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-19364 
CITY OF BINGHAMTON, 
Respondent. 
BALL, McDONOUGH, ARTZ & FARNETI (PHILIP J. ARTZ of counsel), for 
Charging Party 
O'CONNOR, GACIOCH, POPE & TAIT, LLP (ROBERT C. MURPHY of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Binghamton Firefighters, 
Local 729, AFL-CIO, I.A.F.F. (Local) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ). As relevant to the exceptions, the Local alleges in this charge against the City of 
Binghamton (City) that the City violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally changed the procedures under which it 
makes determinations regarding an employee's initial and continuing eligibility for 
benefits afforded sick and disabled fire fighters under General Municipal Law 
(GML) §207-a. The ALJ dismissed the charge as untimely filed upon his own motion 
after a hearing. 
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The Local argues in its exceptions that the ALJ should not have questioned the 
timeliness of the charge because the City had not raised that issue as a defense in its 
answer. Assuming the ALJ was privileged to raise a timeliness issue, the Local argues 
that its charge was timely filed because the four-month filing period1 should be 
calculated from^June 4,-1997,- when the hearing officer-presiding at a GML §207-a 
hearing informed the Local that the "new" procedures would govern that hearing. 
The City argues in response that the ALJ's decision is correct and should be 
affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' arguments, we affirm the 
ALJ's decision. 
Section 204.7(1) of our Rules allows an ALJ to dismiss a charge as untimely filed 
without that issue having been previously raised, but only if the failure of timeliness is 
first revealed at a hearing. This section of the Rules is intended to preserve, to a 
limited degree, the agency's own interest in avoiding the litigation and merits disposition 
of charges which are filed more than four months after the alleged impropriety. A 
failure of timeliness is not simply an affirmative defense even under the current Rules. 
At certain points, and in certain circumstances, a failure of timeliness retains its former 
jurisdictional or quasi-jurisdictional characteristic. Therefore, that the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation processed the charge and that the City did 
not raise timeliness as an affirmative defense to this charge are immaterial 
considerations if the failure of timeliness was first revealed to the ALJ at the hearing. In 
) 1Rules of Procedure (Rules) §204.1 (a)(1). 
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that regard, the hearing in this case consisted of the submission of many documents 
accompanied by argument from the attorneys for the parties. It was not until those 
documents were received into evidence and reviewed by the ALJ that the ALJ first 
realized that this charge likely suffered from a failure of timeliness. Therefore, the ALJ 
waspermitted undertheRulesto raise that issue"OTrhis own motion: 
The remaining question is whether the ALJ correctly dismissed the unilateral 
change aspect of the charge as untimely. 
This charge arose in the context of a GML §207-a hearing involving one unit 
employee, Thomas Giorgio. As the ALJ's decision reflects, the circumstances involving 
Giorgio's effort to retain GML §207-a benefits are somewhat complicated involving, as 
they did, multiple administrative and judicial proceedings. Nonetheless, what clearly 
emerges from this fact pattern is that on October 16, 1996, the City informed the Local 
that although Giorgio's next administrative review hearing, scheduled for October 22, 
1996, would be under the "old" procedures, the "new" procedures would be effective 
January 1, 1997. This announcement of a change in GML §207-a procedures to be 
implemented January 1, 1997 required a charge objecting to the change to be filed 
within four months of January 1, 1997, at the latest.2 
Although recognizing that January 1, 1997 would ordinarily mark the start of its 
filing period, the Local argues that this is not the date from which to calculate the filing 
period for this charge because the City agreed, after its October 16 announcement, to 
negotiate the GML §207-a procedures pursuant to the Local's demand. One 
zCity of Oswego, 23 PERB 1J3007 (1990). 
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negotiating session was held on January 14, 1997 with the promise of additional 
meetings thereafter. 
The City's willingness to negotiate the "new" procedures does not establish, 
however, that the changes it had made to the "old" procedures had been rescinded or 
placed onholdpendingjhosenegotiations. We are_ often presented w 
change cases in which an employer has not negotiated the change prior to its 
implementation, but remains willing to negotiate a possible modification or rescission of 
the change thereafter pursuant to demand. Those after-the-fact negotiations do not 
excuse the refusal to negotiate which exists inherently in unilateral action with respect 
to a noncontractual term and condition of employment.3 As an employer's post-change 
willingness to negotiate is legally unrelated to the refusal to bargain inherent in 
unilateral action itself, such willingness to negotiate after-the-fact cannot enlarge or toll 
the time period allowed for filing charges objecting to the unilateral change. Any 
bargaining upon demand which occurs after an alleged unilateral change in a 
mandatory subject of negotiation has been made simply has no bearing upon whether 
the change itself has been implemented. Phrased differently, being in negotiations 
about a change in terms and conditions of employment does not, by itself, establish that 
the change being negotiated has been rescinded or stayed. 
Although the City had rescinded an earlier announced change in GML §207-a 
procedures, the City never rescinded its October 16, 1996 announced intention to 
implement changes in the "old" GML §207-a hearing procedures on January 1, 1997. 
3Roma v. Ruffo, N.Y.2d , 31 PERB 517504 (Nov. 18, 1998). 
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The City also never took any actions inconsistent with a January 1, 1997 
implementation of the "new" procedures. Therefore, a charge objecting to changes in 
GML §207-a hearing procedures had to be filed at least within four months of 
January 1,1997. As the charge was not filed until October 1, 1997, the ALJ correctly 
dismissed it as untimely-filed. : 
For the reasons set forth above, the Local's exceptions are denied and the ALJ's 
decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: December 10, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
M^LX^JC^. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ORGANIZATION OF STAFF ANALYSTS, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NOS. C-4605, C-4634, 
C-4637 and C-4655 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY and 
MANHATTAN AND BRONX SURFACE TRANSIT 
OPERATING AUTHORITY, 
Employers. 
JOAN STERN KIOK, ESQ., for Petitioner 
MARTIN B. SCHNABEL, VICE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL COUNSEL 
(EVELYN JONAS of counsel), for Employers 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) and the Manhattan and Bronx 
Surface Transit Operating Authority (MBSTOA) move to appeal a ruling made by the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) during the 
processing of certification petitions filed by the Organization of Staff Analysts (OSA). 
OSA seeks to represent approximately 400 employees of the NYCTA or MBSTOA in 
the titles of staff analyst and associate staff analyst. The Director has ordered an 
election by mail ballot to determine whether OSA has majority status in any of the four 
units the parties have stipulated to be appropriate. 
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By letter dated November 2, 1998, the parties were informed by the 
Administrative Law Judge assigned to these cases that the Director would release to 
OSA copies of the mailing labels that had been provided to the Director by NYCTA and 
MBSTOA. The mailing labels identify the names and home addresses of the 
employees in the -four-units^ 
NYCTA and MBSTOA argue that the home address of an employee is personal 
information which the Director cannot release to OSA because disclosure is prohibited 
by the State's Personal Privacy Protection Law (PPPL).1 OSA argues in response that 
NYCTA and MBSTOA do not have standing to contest the Director's disclosure of 
home addresses. On the merits, OSA argues that disclosure of this information is a 
common practice among labor relations agencies, one not prohibited by law and one 
fully consistent with the policies of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). 
Having considered the parties' arguments, we affirm the Director's ruling 
disclosing the home addresses of unit employees to OSA with the conditions and 
restrictions discussed herein. 
Appeal from the Director's ruling at this stage of the representation proceedings 
is with our permission only pursuant to §201.9(c)(4) of our Rules of Procedure (Rules). 
This is the first time an argument has been presented to the agency that the release of 
the home addresses of unit employees to a union participating in a mail ballot election 
1Public Officers' Law §§91-99. 
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is prohibited by law.2 This novel question cannot be reviewed meaningfully after an 
election because the home addresses would by then have been disclosed, arguably in 
violation of the PPPL. Permission to appeal is, therefore, appropriately granted.3 
Two other preliminary issues must be addressed before turning to the merits of 
the parties' arguments 
OSA argues first that we may not consider whether the PPPL permits us to 
disclose the home addresses of unit employees because NYCTA and MBSTOA do not 
have standing to raise that issue as they are not "data subjects".4 A party's status as a 
data subject has relevance to proceedings brought under the PPPL. We are asked to 
review a ruling by the Director which is alleged to be in violation of controlling law. As 
the Director's ruling ordered the disclosure of a list of the home addresses NYCTA and 
MBSTOA prepared and submitted to the Director pursuant to an earlier order, they 
have standing to question before us the Director's subsequent release of the 
information they gave him. Apart from these considerations, our review of questions 
2NYCTA and MBSTOA concede that their release of the home addresses of unit 
employees to the Director is not prohibited by the PPPL. Public Officers' Law §96(d). 
Application of Public Officers' Law §96(d) defeats application of the routine use 
exception to the ban on disclosure. Public Officers' Law §96(d) and the routine use 
exception under Public Officers' Law §96(e) are mutually exclusive. The definition of 
routine use in Public Officers' Law §92(10) incorporates a condition which is the 
opposite of the condition in Public Officers' Law §96(d). If PERB's disclosure of home 
addresses to OSA were permitted as a routine use, NYCTA's and MBSTOA's 
disclosure of home addresses to the Director would not be authorized by Public 
Officers' Law §96(d). 
3State of New York, 31 PERB P058 (1998). 
4See Building A Better New York Comm. v. New York State Comm'n on Gov't 
Integrity, 138 Misc.2d 829 (Sup. Ct. Alb. County 1988). 
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affecting the processing of representation petitions is simply not dependent upon 
notions of standing applicable in a judicial proceeding.5 It matters not who alerts us to a 
possibility that a Director's ruling should be reversed or modified because it is allegedly 
in excess of his power under law. 
Similarly-immaterial-are arguments as to NYGTA's and MBSTOA's motives for 
not wanting the home addresses of its employees disclosed. OSA argues that NYCTA 
and MBSTOA are not concerned about their employees' privacy, only that their 
organization under OSA be prevented or frustrated. Motive, however, has no bearing 
upon the disposition of the question presented to us for disclosure is either prohibited 
by the terms of the PPPL or authorized by that statute. 
Turning to the merits, we have always required the employer party to a mail 
ballot election to provide the agency and the participating unions with a list containing 
the home addresses of unit employees. The home address is needed in a mail ballot 
election because it aids voter identification should there be questions concerning 
eligibility raised upon the return of the ballots by mail. The home address of a public 
employee is clearly, however, personal information within the meaning of the PPPL.6 
The PPPL prohibits the disclosure of personal information except as the PPPL 
authorizes that disclosure. PERB is an agency fully subject to the provisions of the 
PPPL as to personal information in its possession. Therefore, PERB's disclosure of 
5State of New York, supra note 3. 
6Public Officers' Law §92(7). 
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that information to OSA is prohibited by the PPPL unless that disclosure is otherwise 
authorized. 
Section 96(c) of the PPPL allows disclosure of personal information if the 
information is "subject to disclosure under [the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL)]7 
unless the disclosure of such information would constitute an unwarranted invasion of-
personal privacy as defined in [FOIL §89(2)(a)]." 
The State's FOIL generally subjects all records of any type to disclosure except, 
as relevant here, records which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy if disclosed. Therefore, a record containing the home addresses of unit 
employees is one "subject to disclosure" under FOIL, unless that disclosure would 
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy within the meaning of FOIL. 
Several provisions of FOIL and the PPPL are relevant when assessing whether 
disclosure of home addresses in the circumstances presented by these cases would be 
an unwarranted invasion of an employee's personal privacy. 
FOIL §89(2)(b)(iii) provides that a government's sale or release of lists of names 
and addresses is an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy if the lists are to be used 
for commercial or fund-raising purposes. It arguably follows from this section of FOIL 
that the Director's disclosure of employees' home addresses to a union participating in 
a mail ballot election is not an unwarranted invasion of privacy because the information 
is not being used for the purposes specified in FOIL §89(2)(b)(iii). The several 
examples of unwarranted invasions of privacy in FOIL §89(2) are, however, illustrative 
7Public Officers' Law §§84-90. 
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only. Therefore, FOIL §89(2)(b)(iii), although relevant, cannot be dispositive of the 
question before us. 
Section 89(7) of FOIL provides that disclosure of the home address of a public 
employee is not required by FOIL except, perhaps, to a union already certified or 
recognized as a unit representative underthe Act. As OSA observes, however, that 
section of FOIL does not prohibit the release of home addresses to entities other than a 
bargaining agent, it simply provides that a government is not required to release that 
information upon demand.8 Although §89(7) of FOIL is not the source of an express 
prohibition on the disclosure of home addresses, it is minimally a recognition by the 
Legislature that employees have a privacy interest in their home address worthy of 
some protection.9 Like FOIL §89(2)(b)(iii), FOIL §89(7) is relevant, but not dispositive. 
) 
Other parts of the PPPL clearly reflect the Legislature's recognition that certain 
information, even of a personal nature, can be and must be disclosed to the extent . 
necessary to enable government to carry out its statutory mandates and programs.10 
Reading all relevant sections of the PPPL and FOIL together persuades us that 
the Legislature intended to permit the disclosure of home addresses as necessary to 
^Buffalo Teachers Fed'n, Inc. v. Buffalo Bd. ofEduc, 156 A.D.2d 1027 (4th Dep't 
1989), appeal denied, 75 N.Y.2d 708 (1990). 
QAccord Department of Defense v. FLRA, 510 U.S. 487, 145 LRRM 2513 (1994) 
(disclosure of the home addresses of federal civil service employees to facilitate 
negotiations held an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy under federal privacy 
law). 
™E.g., Public Officers Law §§96(b), (d) & (e). 
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enable the Director to determine a union's majority status as required by the Act.11 
Although the disclosure of home address information is an invasion of personal privacy, 
that is not the controlling inquiry. The controlling question under the PPPL is whether 
that disclosure would constitute an "unwarranted" invasion of personal privacy. In 
making thatdetermination
 rwe may-consider the policies of the Act-regarding the 
conduct of an election and balance those statutory interests along with all other 
interests, whether favoring or disfavoring disclosure.12 In our opinion, a restricted 
disclosure to a union of the home addresses of employees in negotiating units for use 
in an election by mail ballot ordered by the Director is not an "unwarranted" invasion of 
personal privacy. 
NYGTA and MBSTOA recognize that the Director needs the home addresses of 
unit employees to hold a mail ballot election. They also concede that a mail ballot is the 
only feasible means by which to hold an election in these cases given the conditions of 
the unit employees' employment. As the ballots are mailed to employees at their home, 
no election could be held by mail ballot without home address information. Just as the 
Director needs this information, so, too, does OSA. The parties participating in a mail 
ballot election appoint observers to assist the Director in ascertaining the identity of the 
voters and their eligibility to vote. Without the home addresses, all parties to a mail 
ballot election would be less able to make intelligent decisions regarding a voter's 
eligibility to vote and less able to assist the Director in making those determinations. 
11Act §207.2. 
^Empire Realty Corp. v. New York State Div. of the Lottery, 230 A.D.2d 270 (3d 
Dep't 1997); Smigel v. Power Auth., 54 A.D.2d 668 (1st Dep't 1976). 
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Moreover, as an employer has in its possession the home addresses of its employees, 
its election observers would have an advantage over unions in questioning and verifying 
voter eligibility if unions were deprived of the same information. A disclosure of home 
addresses to enable a union to assist the Director in verifying voter eligibility in a mail 
ballot election and to ensure that all parties-to-the election are treated equally in this 
regard is not one which constitutes an "unwarranted" invasion of the privacy rights of 
employees. 
We are and must be sensitive, however, to the Legislature's stated recognition 
that individuals have privacy rights in their home address which should be protected 
against unnecessary disclosure. Any disclosure of this information beyond that 
required to enable the parties to assist the Director in the actual conduct of the election 
) 
is prohibited by the PPPL as an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. 
Notwithstanding OSA's argument, it is clear that the home addresses are not provided 
to the participants in a mail ballot election to assist the union with its election campaign 
or to inform the electorate because we have not required a list of home addresses to be 
provided in an on-site, in-person election.13 The private sector precedent OSA relies 
upon, which rests in part on these purposes, is, therefore, not persuasive. Although a 
union party to a mail ballot election may be disadvantaged in its ability to contact 
potential voters without home address information, and the electorate may be less 
informed as a result, the disadvantages are no greater than those presently facing a 
13E.g., County of Ulster, 7 PERB P044 (1974). 
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union in an on-site election. For that reason, those disadvantages are not factors in 
assessing whether the disclosure of that information is permitted under the PPPL. 
To guard against any unwarranted invasion of privacy, the Director should 
disclose the home addresses of unit employees in a mail ballot election at a date which 
- ^ will bestcensure that; there will be no use of the information for purposes unrelated-to 
assisting the Director with the conduct of the election. Unauthorized use can be 
prevented if the Director's disclosure of home addresses is not made until after the due 
date for the agency's receipt of the ballots. The Director should routinely schedule the 
ballot count in mail ballot elections a few days after the home addresses have been 
disclosed to all parties to enable them to review that list for purposes of identifying voter 
eligibility issues or other issues related to the Director's conduct of the election. 
We emphasize that the restricted disclosure ordered in these cases arises in a 
context in which no other party to the election has made any partisan use of the home 
address information which might be in its possession. Whether and to what extent a 
disclosure of home addresses to a participant in a mail ballot election would change 
were another party to the election to use any home addresses of unit employees which 
it might have in its possession for purposes other than assisting the Director with the 
conduct of the election are issues not before us and about which we do not express any 
opinion. We also do not express any opinion as to whether home address information 
would be available to a union in a context other than a mail ballot election, e.g., as part 
of a remedial order in an improper practice proceeding. 
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For the reasons set forth above, the Director's ruling ordering disclosure of the 
home addresses of unit employees to OSA is affirmed upon the conditions and 
restrictions set forth in this decision. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: December 10, 1998 
Albany, New York -
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
arc A. Abbott, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
HERBERT L. LEVY, 
Charging Party, 
- and -
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FEDERATION, 
Respondent. 
HERBERT L. LEVY, pro se 
WILLIAM P. SEAMON, ESQ. (DIONNE A. WHEATLEY of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Herbert L. Levy to a decision by the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) on Levy's 
charge against the Public Employees Federation (PEF). Levy alleges that PEF 
breached its duty of fair representation in violation of §209-a.2(c) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by misrepresenting him in conjunction with 
disciplinary charges filed against him by his employer and by refusing to reimburse him 
for the fees he paid a private attorney who represented him on the disciplinary charges 
after he dismissed his PEF representative. 
The Director dismissed the first allegation as untimely filed because the alleged 
misrepresentation by PEF's representative had occurred no later than October 22, 1997. 
CASE NO. U-20184 
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The charge was not filed until July 28, 1998, more than four months after the acts of 
misrepresentation constituting the alleged improper practice.1 
PEF's refusal to reimburse Levy for the legal expenses he incurred was 
dismissed on the merits because Levy's charge did not evidence that the refusal was 
arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith. 
Levy argues in his exceptions that the charge is timely filed and that the Director's 
decision to the contrary misapprehends and misapplies controlling law and precedent. 
On the merits of the second allegation, Levy argues that PEF was duty bound to pay for 
his private attorney because its agent totally failed to defend him against the disciplinary 
charges. PEF argues in response that the Director correctly dismissed the charge both 
as untimely and on the merits. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' arguments, we affirm the 
Director's decision. 
This charge alleges two legally distinct improper practices which Levy's 
arguments fail to recognize. 
There is an arguable improper practice in the PEF representative's alleged 
insistence that Levy plead guilty to the disciplinary charges with an explanation. To the 
extent that constitutes a wholesale abandonment of representation, as Levy alleges, the 
facts constituting that improper practice were known to Levy in October 1997, when he 
terminated the services of the PEF representative precisely because Levy believed the 
nonattomey representative to be incompetent to handle the particular disciplinary 
1Our Rules of Procedure §204.1 (a)(1) requires charges be filed within four 
months of the act constituting the alleged improper practice. 
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charges which were pending against him. Everything that happened thereafter, whether 
it be Levy's election to retain a private attorney, the arbitrator's dismissal of the 
disciplinary charges, or PEF's rejection of Levy's demand for reimbursement of legal 
expenses, has no legal relationship to the earlier alleged misconduct by PEF's agent. 
The misrepresentation was a separate act of'alleged.improprietyfullyannounced and 
implemented at the date the advice was given. To the extent that advice was improper, 
Levy's rights were then harmed within the meaning of Middle Country Teachers 
Association2 and Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) 217.2(a),3 which merely codifies 
our timeliness principles for application in civil judicial actions and proceedings. 
Contrary to Levy's arguments, a dismissal of the disciplinary charges was not a condition 
precedent to a statutory cause of action grounded upon misrepresentation by PEF's 
agents. A finding that a union has breached its duty of fair representation is a 
precondition to a cause of action against an employer for breach of contract, but 
success on a grievance is not a condition precedent to the filing of an improper practice 
charge against a union for breach of duty grounded upon alleged inadequate 
representation during the processing of the grievance. PEF's rejection of Levy's 
demand for reimbursement of the legal fees he paid is a separate act of alleged 
impropriety. As such, PEF's rejection of his demand for the payment of legal expenses 
could not mark the date of the harm for the alleged improper representation which 
occurred months earlier. Therefore, the Director correctly dismissed as untimely those 
221 PERB 1(3012(1988). 
3The CPLR is not applicable to an administrative proceeding. We comment on 
the CPLR only because Levy has relied upon it in his argument. 
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aspects of the charge alleging that PEF violated the Act by its agent's inadequate 
grievance representation. 
The Director dismissed the aspect of the charge concerning nonpayment of 
Levy's legal expenses on the merits because PEF explained why it was denying the 
paymehrand itsrdehial was fully"consistent with i t ^ ^ 
Levy argues that PEF is required to pay his attorney fees because its agent's 
misrepresentation of his interests forced him to retain an attorney who could understand 
the legal arguments underlying his defense. Even were we to conclude that PEF's 
representation was inadequate during the grievance processing, it would not follow that 
PEF is required by its duty of fair representation under the Act to pay Levy's legal fees. 
PEF's policy and practice is never to provide an attorney to defend disciplinary 
charges which do not expose an employee to discharge. The disciplinary charges 
against Levy did not involve a possible discharge, only a suspension. Although Levy 
considered those disciplinary charges to be very serious, he cannot use a duty of fair 
representation principle to exact a payment from PEF for legal services PEF never 
provides or reimburses. 
If Levy was dissatisfied with his representation, he had several options. He could 
have tried to persuade PEF to appoint a different representative for him. He could have 
tried, as he apparently did, to convince the PEF representative of the merits of his 
defense strategy. He could have continued with his representative and charged PEF, in 
a timely fashion, with a breach of duty grounded upon that agent's alleged 
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misrepresentation with appropriate remedies against both PEF and his employer4 if a 
violation of the Act had been found. Finally, he could have retained outside 
representation, as he did, but at his own expense. What is not among his options, 
however, is legal representation at PEF's expense. To hold otherwise and require PEF 
torpay Levy's'legal "expenseswould place Levy inabetter position than other unit 
employees who do not have the benefit of paid legal representation for discipline short of 
discharge.5 
For the reasons set forth above, Levy's exceptions are denied and the Director's 
decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: December 10, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
4Act §205.5(d) permits for remedial orders against an employer if there has been 
a breach of duty in conjunction with grievance processing. 
transport Workers Union, Local 100, 31 PERB 1J3010 (1998) (union's refusal to 
pay for expert witnesses no violation as the refusal was consistent with the union's 
grievance representation policy). 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on a charge filed against the Buffalo Sewer Authority 
(Authority). 
CSEA alleges in this charge, as amended, that the Authority violated §209-a.1(a) 
and (c) of the Public Employees1 Fair Employment Act (Act) when it eliminated three 
shift superintendent positions and discharged unit employee Kevin Gemerek because 
CSEA had filed and pursued an improper practice charge and a contract grievance.1 
1Under the earlier charge, the Authority was held in violation of the Act for 
assigning nonunit employees to cover shifts left vacant due to the unanticipated 
absence of a shift superintendent. Allegations that assistant shift superintendents were 
improperly assigned to cover for shift superintendents were dismissed. Buffalo Sewer 
Auth., 30 PERB fi3018 (1997), rev'g in part 29 PERB lf4639 (1996). The grievance 
sought out-of-title pay for assistant shift superintendents placed in charge of shifts. 
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After a six-day hearing, the ALJ dismissed the charge. The ALJ found upon 
credibility resolutions, some favorable to CSEA and others favorable to the Authority, 
that neither of the Authority's actions were caused by any exercise of rights protected 
by the Act. 
'CSEA argues irTits exception's that the^ALTl'sd 
incorrect and should be reversed. The Authority argues in response that the ALJ's 
credibility resolutions are correct, but in any event not "reversible, that any inferences 
drawn by the ALJ are supported by the record, and that all material findings of fact are 
consistent with the record. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' arguments, we affirm the 
N ALJ's decision. 
The ALJ's finding, dispositive of the allegation concerning the elimination of the 
three shift superintendent positions in May 1996, was that the Authority had decided to 
reduce the number of shift superintendents from eight to five before the improper 
practice charge and the grievance were filed in August 1995. CSEA argues, however, 
that any decision in this regard was tentative and not finalized until the Authority first 
suspected that the affected employees may have been in contact with CSEA and then 
learned that a charge and a grievance had been filed, which CSEA would not withdraw 
despite the Authority's threat of adverse consequence. 
The record in this regard establishes that the Authority had been concerned 
about an overstaffing in the shift superintendent position and had been discussing staff 
reductions long before any charge or grievance were filed. Even if we were to conclude 
j 
that a decision to reduce the staffing of this position had not been finalized by August 
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1995, CSEA still cannot prevail on this aspect of the charge unless it is concluded that 
the decision to reduce staff would not have been implemented if CSEA had capitulated 
to the Authority's demands to withdraw the improper practice charge. But there is no 
reasonable basis in the record to support a conclusion that, but for either the filing or 
prosecutionTof theTearlieFimproper practice charge^ 
have refrained from reducing its staffing levels. CSEA's arguments that the ALJ 
misread and misinterpreted the record to reach an erroneous conclusion themselves 
rest on descriptions of the record which are inaccurate or misleading. 
The ALJ credited witnesses for CSEA regarding statements made by Anthony 
Hazzan, Acting General Manager of the Authority, as to certain adverse consequences 
N if the improper practice charge were not withdrawn, and other statements arguably 
threatening employees for having contacted CSEA. The ALJ concluded, nonetheless, 
that the shift superintendents' positions were abolished for reasons unrelated to any 
protected activity or those alleged threats. These credibility determinations and the 
dismissal of this aspect of the charge are not inconsistent. Just because there has 
been an exercise of a protected right does not mean that the protected activity is the 
cause for an employer's action. As the ALJ's findings regarding the Authority's 
business reasons for its elimination of certain superintendent positions rest ultimately 
on credibility resolutions, and as those credibility resolutions are fully consistent with the 
record, there is no basis to reverse the ALJ's decision. 
The same rationale requires affirmance of the ALJ's dismissal of the charge 
concerning the Authority's discharge of Gemerek. Indeed, the record evidence 
supporting any improper motivation for Gemerek's discharge is less than that 
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supporting the allegedly improper position abolition. CSEA takes no exception, for 
example, to the ALJ's finding that Gemerek was not involved with either the improper 
practice charge or the grievance, which were originally alleged to be the bases for his 
discharge. 
GSEA alleges in its exceptions that Gemerek was discharged because he was a -
vocal critic of the Authority's plan for abolition of the shift superintendent positions and 
because he had participated in a local labor rally in July 1996. Even if we were to 
consider these new allegations, and even assuming Gemerek's conduct in these 
respects was protected under the Act, there is still no basis for a reversal of the ALJ's 
decision. 
It is clear from the ALJ's decision that the ALJ was aware of Gemerek's conduct 
• ) 
in these particular regards. The ALJ determined, nonetheless, again on credibility 
resolutions, that the Authority's motive for Gemerek's discharge was not an exercise of 
any protected activity. Rather, the ALJ concluded that Gemerek, by his conduct during 
these allegedly protected activities, revealed that he did not have the traits necessary to 
continue in employment with the Authority. An employee's behavior during 
engagement in a protected activity may be considered by an employer in shaping its 
decisions when that behavior has a bearing on the employee's continuing ability to 
perform his or her job.2 Gemerek was no more a critic of the staff reductions than 
others who were retained in the Authority's employ. Nor was Gemerek discharged 
because he participated in a labor rally. Rather, the vulgarities which he directed over a 
2State of New York (Employee Health Servs. Dep't of Transp.), 26 PERB 1J3056 
y
 (1993). 
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bullhorn to Hazzan and Pamela DiPalma, the Authority's Director of Labor Relations, at 
the rally persuaded the Authority that Gemerek, given other on-going, job-related 
problems, had become an unreliable, confrontational employee who frightened other 
employees by angry outbursts and one who lacked the judgment needed to hold a 
supervisory position; 
The ALJ was also aware of what CSEA alleges to be a discrepancy in the 
reasons given by the Authority for discharging Gemerek. The Authority informed the 
Unemployment Insurance Division of the State Department of Labor that Gemerek was 
terminated without cause due to his temporary employee status. Even if these reasons 
are conflicting, the discrepancy has an evidentiary use only and does not compel the 
conclusion that the real reason for the Authority's action is one unlawful under the Act.3 
Notwithstanding any discrepancy in the stated reasons, the ALJ found the evidence that 
the Authority's discharge of Gemerek was not improperly motivated to be 
"overwhelming" and the record affords us no basis to reverse that determination. 
Whether Gemerek's discharge violated his rights under the parties' collective bargaining 
agreement or his rights under other statutes are not issues for us to decide and we 
express no opinion in those respects. 
For the reasons set forth above, CSEA's exceptions are denied and the ALJ's 
decision is affirmed. 
3State of New York (Dep't of Labor), 30 PERB fl3045 (1997). 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: December 10, 1998 
Albany, New York 
arc A. Abbott, wlember 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Holbrook Fire District (District) 
to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finding that it violated §209-a.1(a) 
and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it brought disciplinary 
charges against one of its employees, Jason Feinberg, in retaliation for his efforts in 
attempting to organize District employees for representation by the Civil Service 
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Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Holbrook Fire District 
Unit (CSEA).1 
The ALJ found that Feinberg had been charged with eight counts of misconduct 
from March 1996 through September 1996, the time during which he was actively 
organizing support among his fellow employees for-an employee organization, that the 
District Manager, Deborah Knopfke, knew he was engaged in that organizational 
activity and that the business reasons given by the District for preferring charges 
against Feinberg were pretextual. Determining that Feinberg had been subjected to 
disparate and retaliatory treatment by the District in that others who had committed the 
same or similar offenses as Feinberg had not been disciplined and that some of the 
offenses attributed to Feinberg involved duties that were ancillary to his job of fire 
dispatcher and did not warrant the penalty of discharge, the ALJ held that the District 
had violated §209-a. 1 (a) and (c) of the Act. 
The District excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that it is not supported by the 
record. CSEA has filed cross-exceptions, arguing that the remedy should be modified. 
In all other respects, CSEA concurs with the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we reverse the decision of the ALJ. 
1On March 11, 1996, the Hoibrook Fire District Association fiied a petition 
seeking to represent a unit of employees of the District. On June 17,1996, the 
Association withdrew its petition. On September 3, 1996, CSEA filed a petition seeking 
to represent a unit of firehouse attendant, custodian, watchman, mechanic, district 
secretary and HVAC mechanic. That petition was dismissed pursuant to the 
employees' vote against representation. Holbrook Fire Dist, 30 PERB 1J3035 (1997). 
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The parties submitted the case to the ALJ for decision based upon a stipulated 
record consisting of the appellate return in a proceeding brought pursuant to Civil 
Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) Article 78 to review the decision of the Civil Service 
Law (CSL) §75 hearing officer on the disciplinary charges that were brought against 
Feinberg by the District. The hearing officer sustained six;-of eightcharges against 
Feinberg and recommended his discharge. The return includes the disciplinary charges 
against Feinberg, the CSL §75 hearing transcript, the exhibits and the hearing officer's 
report and recommendations. Both parties also submitted briefs to the ALJ. 
The CSL §75 charges were filed on October 10, 1996 by the District and alleged 
that on March 18, 1996, Feinberg had allowed unauthorized personnel in the radio 
room; that on March 18, he engaged in a prank in the radio room; that he failed to 
) 
timely complete an assignment given to him on May 13, 1996; that he failed to follow 
proper procedures for requesting time off on three occasions in June 1996; that he 
failed to complete the printing and filing of eight monthly reports for the State of 
New York; and that he failed to maintain a New York State Commodities Contract 
book.2 The hearing officer sustained all of these charges and recommended that 
Feinberg be discharged. In addition to issues as to Feinberg's guilt or innocence and 
the appropriate remedy for any wrongdoing, retaliation was raised as a defense to the 
disciplinary charges. As to that, the hearing officer held: 
2Two other charges, alleging that Feinberg failed to properly sign in and out of 
work on several occasions and failed to follow proper procedures related to cleaning 
gear, were not sustained by the CSL §75 hearing officer. 
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The Respondent (Feinberg) claims that Knopfke preferred 
the charges against him in retaliation for his efforts to 
organize the employees of the District. However, most of 
the acts complained of, while occurring after Knopfke 
became aware of the Respondent's efforts to organize, are 
the result of the Respondent's affirmative acts. This 
supports the District's argument that the Respondent 
adopted a recalcitrant attitude after his efforts to organize, 
secure in his belief that his efforts to organize and the filing 
of the Improper Labor Practice charges would insulate him 
from action by the District, (emphasis in original) 
Based on the stipulated record, the ALJ determined that the hearing officer's 
conclusion that Feinberg was guilty of six of the eight acts of misconduct or 
incompetence was controlling. However, the ALJ then went on to decide that the CSL 
§75 hearing officer's findings were of no relevance to the issues before her because 
) PERB has exclusive and nondelegable jurisdiction over §209-a.1 (a) and (c) allegations. 
The ALJ found that while Feinberg had committed the acts complained of, other 
employees had been involved in the same or similar acts of misconduct and had not 
had charges filed against them. As to the hearing officer's findings as to union animus, 
the ALJ found them to be "cursory and superficial" and decided the charge without 
relying on the hearing officer's finding that there was no retaliation. We do not agree 
with the ALJ's analysis of the preclusive effect of the hearing officer's finding regarding 
the District's motivation for seeking to discharge Feinberg. 
The ALJ correctly determined that the CSL §75 hearing officer's decision could 
not be given collateral estoppel effect because the District did not raise collateral 
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estoppel as an affirmative defense and, thus, waived it.3 However, we find that the ALJ 
should have deferred to the findings of the hearing officer that the charges against 
Feinberg were brought by the District for proper business reasons and not to retaliate 
against him for his organizing activities. 
In NewYorkCityTransit'Authority'(Bordansky) (hereafter Bordansky),- it was 
determined that the factual conclusions in an arbitration proceeding could be accepted 
in an improper practice proceeding if three standards are met: the issues raised by the 
improper practice charge were fully litigated in the arbitral proceeding; the arbitral 
proceeding was not tainted by unfairness or serious procedural irregularities; and the 
determination of the arbitrator was not clearly repugnant to the purposes or policies of 
the Taylor Law.5 PERB decisions have held that the doctrine is applicable in improper 
practice charges alleging violations of §209-a.1(a) and (c).6 The same deferral policy is 
applicable to determinations by a CSL §75 hearing officer where there is a requisite 
identity of issues. We find that the policies of the Act are best effectuated when parties 
are precluded from relitigating before the agency issues they have raised in a CSL §75 
proceeding, especially where, as here, the parties make the CSL §75 record the record 
for purposes of deciding the improper practice charge. When the parties themselves 
exhibit their mutual intent to have a charge decided on the record made in another 
3Kaufman v. Eli Lily & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 449 (1985); Matter of Ranni, 58 N.Y.2d 715 
(1982); Schwartz v. Public Administrator, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 71 (1969). 
44 PERB 1J3031 (1971). 
5See State of New York (Dep't of Mental Hygiene), 11 PERB 1J3084 (1978). 
./ 6ld. 
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forum, they are bound by the factual findings made by the trier of fact in the earlier 
proceeding. Where, as here, the parties have raised the same legal issues in the 
earlier proceeding, and the proceeding meets the requirements of Bordansky, it is 
appropriate to defer to the CSL §75 hearing officer's findings insofar as it relates to 
conclusions of improper motivation^ 
Here, the hearing officer weighed the testimony of all the witnesses at the CSL 
§75 hearing, including Feinberg and Knopfke. He determined that Feinberg had 
deliberately committed six of the eight offenses he had been charged with and that the 
District had legitimate business reasons for seeking his discharge. The allegations at 
the CSL §75 hearing included the retaliation claim at issue here. In finding that 
Feinberg's discharge was warranted, the hearing officer rejected the claim of improper 
motivation. The parties themselves stipulated that the hearing officer's decision and the 
record before him would form the record in the case before the ALJ. Having so 
stipulated, the parties are bound by that record and the ALJ was likewise bound to 
accept the hearing officer's conclusion as to union animus, at the very least a mixed 
question of fact and law.8 It was the CSL §75 hearing officer who had the opportunity to 
assess the witnesses' credibility, not the ALJ. The CSL §75 hearing officer expressly 
considered the claim of retaliation and determined that the District acted based on valid 
business reasons, not because of Feinberg's protected activity. Such findings clearly 
7See Matter of Lester (IHon Water Comm'n-Hartnett), 149 A.D.2d 800 (3d Dep't 
1989). See also Odessa-Montour Cent. Sch. Dist, 30 PERB 1J4676 (1997), where the 
ALJ gave preclusive effect to an arbitrator's award finding lack of discriminatory motive. 
j 8See Matter of Guimarales (New York City Bd. ofEduc.-Roberts), 68 N.Y.2d 989 
(1986). 
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decide CSEA's claim and, under the standards of our deferral policy, precluded the ALJ 
from concluding that Feinberg's discharge was improperly motivated.9 
Based on the foregoing, we reverse the decision of the ALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: December 10, 1998 
Albany, New York 
^U^^c/^euJ^l^^-^ 
R. Cuevas, Chairman 
c A. ABbott, W l e m b e Y ^ v 
See County of Cattaraugus, 24 PERB p 0 0 1 (1991). 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Croton-Harmon Union Free 
School District (District) to a decision by the Assistant Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Assistant Director) on an improper practice charge filed 
by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Croton School District-Local 860-Unit 9159 (CSEA). The charge, as amended, alleges 
that the District violated §209-a.1(a), (c) and (d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when, in retaliation for the exercise of protected rights, it levied 
disciplinary charges against three unit employees resulting in their termination. 
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The Assistant Director found that the District instituted an investigation into 
claims for overtime payment in an effort to retaliate against two employees: Aaron 
Garner, CSEA custodial unit president, and Peter Diorio, the vice-president. As a result 
of the investigation, it was discovered that Garner and Diorio had received payment for 
overtime that they..had not.worked,. The investigation was thereafter expanded and it 
was discovered that another unit employee, William Hobby, had submitted similar 
claims and that Garner and Diorio had made additional claims for payment for overtime. 
Disciplinary charges were filed by the District against the three and they were thereafter 
terminated pursuant to the report and findings of a Civil Service Law (CSL) §75 hearing 
officer. 
The Assistant Director adopted the factual findings of the CSL §75 hearing 
officer that the three employees had sought and received payment for overtime hours 
that they had not worked, but determined that the investigation into overtime was 
commenced by Frank Raposeiro, the District's Superintendent of Buildings and 
Grounds, in retaliation for Garner's and Diorio's exercise of protected rights. Finding 
that the investigation was improperly motivated, the Assistant Director held that the 
disciplinary charges and the resulting termination of all three employees violated 
§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Act as they resulted from the improperly motivated 
investigation. The District was ordered to reinstate all three employees, make them 
whole for any lost wages or benefits, remove from their records all references to the 
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disciplinary charges and cease and desist from taking disciplinary actions against these 
employees in retaliation for the exercise of rights protected by the Act.1 
The District excepts to the Assistant Director's decision, arguing that merely 
reporting misconduct does not constitute an improper recommendation or request, that 
there was an independent, legitimate business reason for terminating the affected 
employees, and that no violation can be found as to Hobby because he was not 
engaged in protected activity. 
CSEA has filed cross-exceptions claiming that the record establishes that the 
actions of both the Superintendent of Schools, Marjorie Castro, who brought the 
charges against the three employees, and the District's Business Manager, Alan 
Berkow, who had presented to Castro the investigation results received from 
Raposeiro, were improperly motivated. In all other respects, CSEA supports the 
Assistant Director's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the Assistant Director, but reverse as to remedy. 
Until their discharge, Garner and Diorio had been night custodians at the 
District's high school. Their regular hours of work were from 3:00 p.m. to 11:30 p.m. 
They became, respectively, the president and vice-president of the CSEA custodial unit 
1The Assistant Director dismissed the allegation that §2Q9-a.1(d) of the Act had 
been violated. Based on the CSL §75 hearing officer's finding that there had been no 
agreement between the District and the three affected employees that allowed them to 
receive overtime pay for hours not worked, the Assistant Director found that there had 
been no agreement and no practice which had been altered. No exceptions have been 
taken to this part of the Assistant Director's decision. 
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in mid-1995.2 It is undisputed that they were engaged in protected activities, such as 
filing grievances and raising safety concerns, from the time they became CSEA officers 
to the time they were suspended pending the outcome of the February 25, 1997 
disciplinary charges filed against them.3 Raposeiro was the recipient of their 
memoranda^ ^ 
memoranda sent by either Garner or Diorio to Raposeiro. Relations between 
Raposeiro and Garner and Diorio deteriorated steadily through 1995, 1996, and early 
1997. Larry Sparber, the CSEA Labor Relations Specialist assigned to the District, 
testified that, in July 1996, Raposeiro stated that Garner and Diorio "were stirring up a 
problem, and that if any of the other employees got involved...there would be 
repercussions." In the fall of 1996, Raposeiro told Frank Baglieri, a former Local 
president: "Them guys [Garner and Diorio] think they're pretty funny and smart. They 
better watch it, because I have ways of getting even." 
In late February 1997, Raposeiro requested that the Scarsdale Security 
Systems, Inc., the operator of the District's security system, give him records of when 
the alarm system at the District's high school had been turned on and off during the 
previous few weeks.4 While Raposeiro originally testified that such a check was 
2Hobby is also a night custodian. He holds no office in CSEA. 
3On August 26, 1996, Garner, Diorio, Hobby and another custodian grieved an 
r\rrir\ir m ^ f l i u f l n Tirr\irm Df-if*/-*€>'"*•»•''"* 
W I U G I I C O C I V C U I I W I I I I \ O | J U O C M U . 
4The alarm system is off while employees are in the school. At the time that the 
last custodian leaves, the alarm system is reactivated and the time is recorded. Anyone 
moving about in the school after that will set off the alarms at the Security Systems' 
Control Center. 
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"routine", he later conceded that he had never made such a request before, but that 
"something" told him he should check at that time. 
The investigation revealed that on several occasions, Garner and Diorio had put 
in for overtime, indicating that they had worked until 2:30 a.m., when the alarm system 
had actually been activated at 11:30 p.m 
Berkow, who in turn informed Castro. Castro brought disciplinary charges against 
Garner and Diorio on February 25, 1997, for claiming overtime on three occasions for 
hours not worked. Castro then directed that the time sheets for all custodians be 
checked back to September 1996. The results showed that Garner had claimed 
overtime on two other occasions, Diorio on seven other occasions, and that Hobby had 
claimed overtime for time not actually worked on seven occasions.5 On March 4, 1997, 
additional disciplinary charges were filed against Garner and Diorio and charges were 
filed against Hobby. 
It is undisputed that Garner and Diorio were engaged in protected activities and 
that the District was aware of their activities. The record shows that while Castro made 
the decision to file the disciplinary charges against the three employees, it was 
Raposeiro who initiated the investigation that led to those charges being brought.6 The 
5None of the employees denied that they had put in for three hours of overtime 
on certain evenings when they had left at 11:30 p.m. They claimed that they did so 
pursuant to an agreement with their supervisors permitting them to do so in a "man out" 
situation, which is when one of the three-person evening custodial crew was absent. 
i i I O i vvw i d i i o n in l y c i n p i u y c c o n d u I U u u n i p i c i c u 10 u n t i l c i i i p i u y o o o vvwi i \ d u u , n IL vvdo 
completed during their regular shift, they alleged that they were entitled to claim three 
hours of overtime. As noted earlier, the CSL §75 hearing officer found that no such 
agreement existed. 
6Berkow merely transmitted the information to Castro. 
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Assistant Director found that the record did not support a finding that Castro was 
motivated by anti-union animus in making the decision to file the disciplinary charges. 
But he found that Raposeiro would not have initiated his investigation but for Garner's 
and Diorio's exercise of protected rights.7 
In ElmiraCitySchoolDistric^ 
Gates), it was held that where there is an improperly motivated request for employment 
action, or an employment action that is based upon information gleaned from an 
improperly motivated investigation, the action itself may be found to be violative of the 
Act, even if that request or information is acted upon by an individual or body without 
improper motivation. Here, the Assistant Director found that the charges would not 
have been filed against Garner, Diorio and Hobby but for the information obtained by 
Raposeiro's improperly motivated investigation. The filing of the disciplinary charges, 
the suspension, the subsequent disciplinary charges which encompassed Hobby, and 
the termination of all three employees all flow from Raposeiro's tainted investigation 
and are, therefore, violative of §209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Act.10 
7City of Salamanca, 18 PERB1J3012 (1985). 
814PERB lf3015 (1981). 
915 PERB 1J3079 (1982). 
™Hr»hh\/5c c u c n o n c i r m anr l H i c r h p r n o wirJpto f h n A r t o \ /on t h r w m h it u/ac f n n n r l 
that he engaged in no protected activities at a time proximate to the time that charges 
were filed against him. A public employer may not take an adverse employment action 
against a represented employee because of the activities of that employee's bargaining 
agents or the officers of that employee organization. See City of Buffalo, 30 PERB 
P021 (1997). 
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We must now address the appropriate remedy. The Assistant Director ordered 
the reinstatement of all three employees. Their intentional misconduct, however, is 
sufficient to deny them reinstatement. 
In this case, it is only the initial investigation which was improperly motivated. 
The Assistant Director found that the actions based upon the receipt of the inform 
obtained from the investigation were not improperly motivated and there is no basis in 
the record to reverse that finding. In neither Gates nor Elmira were the employees 
found guilty of an act of intentional misconduct. Therefore, neither of those cases is 
controlling as to the question of remedy. Similarly, City of Albany v. PERB" is 
distinguishable both because the discharge itself was improperly motivated in that case 
and the employee had only been negligent in the operation of a piece of equipment. 
The remedial issue is, therefore, largely an open issue. 
Here, Garner, Diorio and Hobby committed a serious, intentional offense and 
were found to have done so by the CSL §75 hearing officer. The three would most 
certainly have been the recipients of disciplinary charges resulting in their discharge if 
their wrongdoing had been discovered independently by Berkow or Castro, who 
harbored no union animus. The nature of their wrongdoing, a deliberate theft of 
overtime money, does not easily lend itself to an order to restore them to their positions, 
even though the Assistant Director found that the "system" which allowed their 
misconduct to take place no longer exists. These employees are members of the 
evening custodial crew, they are alone in the school building and are entrusted to turn 
1157 A.D.2d 374, 10 PERB fl7012 (3d Dep't 1977), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 954, 
11 PERB H7007 (1978). 
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on the security system and lock the building when they leave, as well as maintaining the 
security of all areas while they are in the building. 
In determining the appropriate remedial action, we must balance competing yet 
compelling rights and interests. The District has a legitimate concern with having 
reinstated employees who have proveni themselves to be untrustworthyand who have 
been found guilty of serious acts of intentional misconduct. At the same time, 
Raposeiro's investigation was grounded upon Garner's and Diorio's exercise of the 
fundamental rights they have under the Act both as employees and as officers of 
CSEA. 
In striking the appropriate balance, we are guided by our own case law and that 
arising under other labor and employment legislation which we find to be equally 
applicable to the remedial question before us. In City of OleanJ2 an employee was 
terminated because he lied on his job application about prior felony convictions. It was 
there found that the employer had commenced its investigation of the employee 
because of his exercise of protected rights. However, because it would not effectuate 
the purposes of the Taylor Law and because the employer had a policy of not 
employing convicted felons, the employee was not ordered reinstated. Several cases 
have arisen under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) with facts similar to the 
122PERB jf3069(1968). 
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case before us.13 In NLRB v. Magnusen,™ the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
determined that an employee who had been unlawfully discharged because of his union 
activities was not properly reinstated because he had admitted to padding his hours on 
an occasion when he was not working. The Court likened the padding of hours to theft 
of money from the employer. To require the reinstatement of an employee who stole 
from his employer would not, the Court found, effectuate the policies of the NLRA and 
would "reward conduct both reprehensible in quality and egregious in scope."15 In 
NLRB v. Big Three Welding Equipment Co.,™ the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that employees who had been unlawfully discharged because of their unionizing efforts 
should not be reinstated because of their serious misconduct in pilfering the employer's 
property. Noting that "such distasteful misconduct is sufficient reason for refusing 
) 
reinstatement", the Court decided : 
[w]e are firmly convinced that the purposes and policies of 
the [NLRA] would not be effectuated by the reinstatement of 
these two employees with an admitted record of highly 
objectionable misconduct in a relatively small company 
where relationships are close and conduct of the type here 
involved is inevitably known to other employees as well as 
management.17 
13See, e.g., NLRB v. Apico Inns of California, Inc., 512 F.2d 1171, 88 LRRM 
3283 (9th Cir. 1975); NLRB v. Commonwealth Foods, Inc., 506 F.2d 1065, 87 LRRM 
2609 (4th Cir. 1974); NLRB v. Breitling, 378 F.2d 663, 65 LRRM 2477 (10th Cir. 1967) 
14523 F.2d 643, 90 LRRM 3330 (9th Cir. 1975). 
1590 LRRM at 3332. 
16359 F.2d 77, 62 LRRM 2058 (5th Cir. 1966) 
'62 LRRM at 2063. 
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The Supreme Court's decision in McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing 
Company15 is particularly instructive. There, McKennon, a sixty-two year-old employee 
alleged that she was terminated by her employer because of her age in violation of the 
federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). While being deposed by her 
employerin the> course of her.lawsuit, McKennon admitted[to copying and taking home 
certain confidential documents, an offense which would have warranted her discharge. 
Her employer then terminated her for removing company documents from the office. 
The Supreme Court held that, although the wrongdoing by McKennon did not totally bar 
her from recovery in her age-discrimination suit, McKennon was entitled to back pay 
only from the date of her wrongful termination to the date that her employer discovered 
her wrongdoing. The Court specifically held that an order of reinstatement would not be 
appropriate. In declining to reinstate, the Court observed: 
In determining appropriate remedial action, the employee's 
wrongdoing becomes relevant not to punish the employee, 
or out of concern "for the relative moral worth of the parties" 
(footnote omitted), but to take due account of the lawful 
prerogatives of the employer in the usual course of its 
business and the corresponding equities that it has arising 
from the employee's wrongdoing. 
The rationale articulated in these federal cases is applicable here. All of these 
cases reflect a very clear and consistent belief that labor and employment policies are 
not effectuated by an order reinstating employees who have committed intentional acts 
of flagrant misconduct even if their employers have violated those labor and 
employment laws. In the final analysis, it was not these employees' exercise of 
513 U.S. 353(1995). 
Board - U-19091 -11 
statutorily protected rights which caused them to lose their jobs. They lost their jobs 
because they were in a position of trust and stole from their employer. They cannot 
look to the Act for insulation from their willful misconduct. In this case, the policies of 
the Act are fully effectuated by a posting informing unit employees that there has been 
a violation of the Act in the improperly motivated investigation and the actions based 
thereon. No other order is necessary or appropriate. 
We find that the District violated §209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Act when it 
commenced its investigation of Garner and Diorio and disciplined them and Hobby 
pursuant to information revealed during that investigation and that it must post a notice 
to that effect in all locations ordinarily used to communicate with unit employees. 
Based on the foregoing, the District's exceptions as to remedy are granted and 
CSEA's cross-exceptions are denied. The Assistant Director's decision is affirmed, 
except as to remedy. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the District: 
Sign and post the attached notice at all locations normally used to post 
notices of information to employees in the CSEA custodial unit. 
DATED: December 10, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
bott, MWnber 
Marc A. At 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the Croton-Harmon Union Free School District in the unit represented by Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Croton School District-Local 869-Unit 9159 
(CSEA) that the Croton-Harmon Union Free School District violated §209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act) when Frank Raposeiro initiated an investigation of the overtime claimed by Aaron 
Garner and Peter Diorio in retaliation for their exercise of rights protected by the Act and when Aaron Garner, 
Peter Diorio and William Hobby were subjected to disciplinary charges and discharged upon information 
discovered as a result of the unlawful investigation into their overtime claims. 
-. ") 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
Croton-Harmon Union Free School District 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by 
any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UTICA PROFESSIONAL FIREFIGHTERS 
ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 32, IAFF, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-19829 
CITY OF UTICA, 
Respondent. 
GRASSO & GRASSO (JANE K. FININ of counsel), for Charging Party 
ROEMER WALLENS & MINEAUX LLP (JAMES W. ROEMER, JR., and 
JEFFREY S. HARTNETT of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
By decision dated November 23, 1998,1 we held that all but one of the City of 
Utica's (City) demands submitted to an interest arbitration panel are terms and 
conditions of employment within the meaning of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act). No determination was made as to the negotiability of City 
demand number 66 calling for employees who are represented by the Utica 
Professional Firefighters Association Local 32, IAFF, AFL-CIO (Association) to undergo 
periodic random drug testing because we iacked the factual record necessary for 
131 PERB H3075(1998). 
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making that determination. Accordingly, the charge was remanded to the Assistant 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation for further proceedings as 
to demand 66. 
By letter dated December 3, 1998, the City has withdrawn its demand for random 
drug testing from consideration by the interest arbitration panel. 
All issues in the charge now having been resolved, and on the basis of our 
earlier decision, the Association's charge against the City is hereby dismissed. SO 
ORDERED. 
DATED: December 10, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, 
LOCAL UNION NO. 15315, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-18931 
CITY OF NIAGARA FALLS, 
Respondent. 
E. JOSEPH GIROUX, JR., ESQ., for Charging Party 
ROBERT P. MERINO, ESQ. (TIMOTHY G. BAX of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the City of Niagara Falls (City) to a 
decision and recommended order of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The ALJ held 
that the City violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) 
by unilaterally subcontracting certain work that had been exclusively performed by 
employees in a bargaining unit represented by the United Steel Workers of America, 
Local Union No. 15315 (USWA) to a private firm. 
The City argues that it had no duty to negotiate with USWA concerning its 
decision to subcontract the work, that USWA waived whatever bargaining rights it may 
have had to negotiate concerning the decision, and, in any event, that it satisfied 
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whatever statutory bargaining obligations it may have had to negotiate with USWA. 
USWA argues that the ALJ should be affirmed. 
Having considered the record and the parties' arguments, we affirm the ALJ. 
USWA represents a unit of blue-collar employees in the City's Division of 
Sanitation of the Department of Public Works (sanitation Until January 2, 
1997, sanitation workers exclusively collected all municipal, residential and commercial 
garbage throughout the City, including bulk trash, white goods and recyclable tires. 
Recyclable paper, plastic and glass were sorted and deposited in appropriate 
dumpsters at a central location by City residents themselves. However, the sanitation 
workers evacuated the refrigerant from refrigerators prior to recycling. The sanitation 
workers brought all of the garbage that they collected to a landfill operated by BFI, Inc. 
under a twenty-year-old contractual arrangement between BFI and the City. That 
contract expired on July 31, 1996. 
In late June or early July 1996, City Administrator Anthony Restaino advised 
USWA president John Soro that the City was considering a plan to privatize its 
sanitation services. Restaino told Soro that a draft of the City's request for proposals 
under General Municipal Law §120-w was available from the City's purchasing agent. 
Restaino invited Soro to comment on the draft during the public comment period "to 
show us where they [unit employees] could remain competitive." USWA did not 
comment on the City's draft request for proposals during the public comment period. 
The City published a formal request for proposals from private firms in September, and 
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bids were opened on October 15. The low bid was submitted by Modern Disposal 
Services, Inc. 
In an October 22 letter to Soro, David Fabrizio, the City's Director of Human 
Resources and chief negotiator, observed that USWA had not commented on the draft 
request for proposals and that the contemplated privatization wouldi seriously impact 
unit employees.1 Therefore, he invited USWA to negotiate concerning the impact of the 
City's intentions. 
On October 30, Soro met with Restaino and Fabrizio. Although Restaino and 
Fabrizio wanted to discuss the impact of the City's desire to privatize its sanitation 
services, Soro wanted to discuss the decision itself. Soro opined that the cost of using 
unit employees was competitive with Modern Disposal, but wanted additional time to 
compile his figures. On November 1, the Mayor submitted his budget to the City's 
Common Council. The Mayor's budget provided that the City's sanitation services 
would not be performed by City employees. At a November 6 meeting with Restaino, 
Soro reiterated his belief that unit employees could perform the work competitively. 
Resaino responded that the decision was now a budgetary issue for the Common 
Council. Therefore, Soro submitted a cost analysis to the Common Council in an 
attempt to show that using unit employees was cost effective. On December 2, the 
Council adopted a budget restoring City sanitation workers. On December 3, the Mayor 
met with Soro and said that USWA's figures were not persuasive, and that he was 
1The text of the letter is set forth in the ALJ's decision. 
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going to privatize the work. Thereafter, the Mayor vetoed the Council's amendment 
and on December 13, 1996, the Council's veto override resolution failed. 
On December 31, 1996, the Mayor executed a contract with Modern Disposal.2 
Under that contract, effective January 2, 1997, Modern Disposal collects and disposes 
all municipal, residential and commercial garbage. Modern Disposal disposes the 
garbage that it collects at a landfill that it operates. The contract also requires Modern 
Disposal to undertake a new curbside recycling program. Under that program, City 
residents and businesses place their recyclable material in bins that Modern Disposal 
provides. They place the bins at the curb where Modern Disposal's employees sort and 
collect the material. Modern Disposal brings the recyclables to its headquarters in 
Model City, New York. 
After entering its contract with Modern Disposal, the City transferred some of the 
sanitation workers to the City's Street Construction Division, and it discharged 
approximately thirty-eight others. Under its arrangement with Modern Disposal, the City 
obtains a savings of approximately one million dollars annually, offering some relief to 
its fiscal distress.3 
2The execution of the contract was subsequently challenged by the unsuccessful 
bidder and was held void unless properly ratified by the Common Council. By 
resolution dated April 14, 1997, the Council ratified the contract retroactively to 
December 31, 1996. 
3ln January, 1996, when the current administration took office, the City was faced 
with an operating deficit of approximately five million dollars. Its taxes were rising, and 
its bonds were rated one step above junk grade. 
Board - U-18931 -5 
The ALJ held that the City had a statutory duty to negotiate with USWA 
concerning its decision to subcontract its existing sanitation services to Modern 
Disposal. Concluding that the City had not satisfied that duty, the ALJ held that it 
violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act. The ALJ held, however, that the City was under no 
obligation to negotiate with USWA concerning its decision to subcontract the curbside 
collection of recyclable paper, plastic and glass because that work had never been 
performed by unit employees. To that limited extent, therefore, the ALJ dismissed 
USWA's improper practice charge. 
As a general rule, a public employer violates §209-a.1(d) of the Act by 
unilaterally subcontracting work that has been exclusively performed by unit employees 
where the subcontracted work is substantially similar to the unit work, unless the 
qualifications for the tasks have been changed significantly.4 In analyzing whether the 
work performed by a subcontractor is substantially similar to the work previously 
performed by unit employees, we look to the nature of the work itself.5 The fiscal or 
operational wisdom of a decision to subcontract unit work is immaterial to the 
negotiability of the subject.6 
^Niagara Frontier Transp. Auth., 18 PERB 1J3083 (1985). 
5See State of New York (Dep't of Correctional Servs.), 27 PERB ff3055 (1994), conf'd 
sub nom. State of New York (Dep't of Correctional Servs.) v. PERB, 220 A.D.2d 19, 29 
PERB 1J7008 (3d Dep't 1996). 
6See City of Poughkeepsie v. Newman, 95 A.D.2d 101, 16 PERB 1J7021 (3d Dep't 
1983), appeal dismissed, 60 N.Y.2d 859, 16 PERB fl7027 (1983), leave to appeal 
denied, 62 N.Y.2d 608, 17 PERB 1J7009 (1984). 
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Here, there is no dispute that unit employees exclusively collected and disposed 
all of the City's municipal, residential and commercial trash, including bulk trash and 
white goods, until the City entered its contract with Modern Disposal. There is no 
evidence that the City altered the qualifications necessary to perform those tasks, and 
there is no evidence that USWA ever cons^ntedjo the Cjty's decision to privatize the 
work. 
The City's argument that it had no duty to negotiate with USWA concerning its 
decision to privatize its sanitation services is grounded on two theories. First, the City 
argues that it ceased to provide sanitation services once the work was undertaken by 
Modern Disposal. Noting that a public employer's decision to abolish or curtail its 
services is not mandatorily negotiable,7 the City contends that it was not required to 
negotiate with USWA concerning its decision to subcontract the work. Moreover, 
relying on our decision in Town of Brookhaven,8 the City argues that to the extent it 
retains any control over Modern Disposal's day-to-day operations, that control is de 
minimis. 
The City's argument does not accurately characterize the effect of its contractual 
relationship with Modern Disposal. All garbage collection performed by Modern 
Disposal, as well as Modern Disposal's recycling tasks, are being done at the City's 
behest under contract. Thus, it is an irrefutable fact that the City is still providing 
sanitation services to its constituents. The City has simply changed the personnel who 
7City Sen. Dist. of the CityofNewRochelle, 4 PERB ^3060 (1971). 
828PERB H3010(1995). 
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perform the work. Town of Brookhaven is inapposite. In that case, the vestiges of 
control retained by the Town overwork once performed by unit employees was not 
sufficient to defeat the Town's claim that it ceased to provide the in-issue service. 
Here, whether the City has extensive control, or no control at all, over Modern 
Disposal's day-to-day operations is immaterial. The City simply has not abolished its 
sanitation services.9 
The City's second argument that it had no duty to negotiate with USWA is that 
the service it now provides through Modern Disposal is not substantially similar to the 
work previously performed by unit employees. In support, the City emphasizes that 
Modern Disposal must weigh and ticket each truckload of garbage so that it can bill the 
City, that Modern Disposal is responsible for disposing of all of the trash and recyclable 
material that it collects at its facility in Model City, New York, that Modern Disposal picks 
up one bulk item per week, per household, in addition to the two yearly pick-ups that 
unit employees used to perform, and that Modern Disposal now sorts and collects 
recyclable material at the curbside. 
The differences stressed by the City are insignificant and mostly immaterial. 
What Modern Disposal does to bill the City is not relevant to the nature of the service 
that it provides. Similarly, the fact that Modern Disposal takes the garbage it collects to 
its own landfill does not constitute a change in the work performed. Unit employees 
9A different anaiysis wouid be warranted if, for example, the City simpiy ceased to 
provide sanitation services, requiring City residents and businesses to arrange for their 
own garbage disposal by whatever means necessary. But, that is clearly not what the 
City did here. 
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also took the garbage they collected to a landfill. Likewise, it is immaterial that Modern 
Disposal collects bulk trash more frequently than did unit employees. The frequency of 
the work performed does not affect the nature of the work itself.10 
As for the new curbside recycling program, the City argues that it is an 
inseparable element of its current sanitation services and that this new program, in 
conjunction with the work previously performed by unit employees, constitutes an 
entirely new service. Indeed, without elaboration, the City contends that "privatization 
could not have taken place without curbside recycling." Thus, according to the City, 
while the ALJ correctly held that its decision to subcontract the recycling program is not 
mandatorily negotiable, she erred in treating that program as a separate function when 
comparing the work once performed by unit employees and those performed by 
Modern Disposal. 
However, we see no basis in law or fact to conclude that the City's recycling 
program is an inseparable element of the City's sanitation services. Recyclables are 
not collected in the same trucks as trash, and they are treated differently after they are 
collected. Indeed, recycling had historically been independent of the City's garbage 
collection. Under the City's theory, the City could provide no sanitation services unless 
the same group of people who collect garbage also sort and collect recyclables. We 
find no merit in that theory. We hold, therefore, that the new recycling program does 
not substantially alter the collection of residential, municipal and commercial garbage 
that was previously performed by unit employees. 
10See Union-Endicott Cent. Sch. Dist, 29 PERB fi3056 (1996) rev'd on other 
grounds, _A.D.2d _ , 31 PERB 1J7016 (3d Dep't 1998). 
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In reaching that conclusion, we also note that the City's argument is essentially 
the converse of our analysis in County of Westchester." There, although unit 
employees exclusively performed some of the tasks that were unilaterally transferred to 
nonunit personnel, they had not exclusively performed the core components of that 
work. Therefore, we concludedI that; the County was under no duty to negotiate 
concerning its decision to transfer all of the work to nonunit personnel. Here, the core 
component of the work now performed by Modern Disposal is municipal, residential and 
commercial garbage collection and disposal. That unit employees cannot claim 
exclusivity over the new recycling tasks does not defeat their claim of exclusivity over 
the core component of the City's sanitation services-garbage collection.12 Therefore, 
the fact that the City was under no duty to negotiate with USWA concerning its decision 
to privatize its recycling program does not mean that it had no obligation to negotiate 
concerning its decision to privatize the rest of the work. 
Accordingly, we reject the City's arguments that it had no statutory duty to 
negotiate with USWA concerning its decision to subcontract the work of collecting and 
dumping all municipal, residential and commercial garbage. 
The City's claim that USWA waived its right to negotiate concerning the City's 
decision to subcontract the work is also grounded on two theories. Each turns on a 
single proposition of law: that a public employer is free to alter existing terms and 
conditions of employment, absent a union's demand to negotiate. 
1131 PERB 1J3034 (1998). 
12See County of Westchester, 31 PERB 1J3035 (1998). 
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First, the City argues that a demand to negotiate is a condition precedent to an 
unlawful refusal to negotiate under §209-a.1(d). Because USWA did not affirmatively 
seek to negotiate concerning the City's decision to privatize the in-issue work, the City 
contends that it had no duty to bargain. However, that argument overlooks the 
difference between improper practice charges that are premised on a refusal to 
negotiate on demand and those that are premised on a unilateral change in existing 
terms and conditions of employment. As we held in Germantown Central School 
District,™ a unilateral subcontract of unit work 
is itself a per se rejection of the bargaining process and a 
refusal to bargain. No demand to bargain is necessary in 
such circumstance. A demand to bargain is necessary only 
to those §209-a.1(d) allegations which are grounded upon a 
refusal to bargain pursuant to a specific demand. A refusal 
) to bargain premised upon a unilateral change in a 
mandatory subject of negotiation is a violation of the Act 
separate from a refusal to bargain pursuant to demand, 
[footnote omitted] 
Here, the alleged violation of §209-a.1(d) is also premised on a unilateral decision to 
subcontract unit work, not a refusal to negotiate on demand. Therefore, a demand to 
negotiate is not a condition precedent to the violation found.14 
1326 PERB U3003, at 3007 (1993), rev'd on other grounds, sub nom. Germantown 
Cent. Sch. Dist. v. PERB, 205 A.D.2d 961, 27 PERB fl7009 (3d Dep't 1994). 
uRoma v. Ruffo, _N.Y.2d 1998 WL 796862 (Nov. 18, 1998). See also Odessa-
Montour Cent. Sch. Dist, 28 PERB 1J3013 (1995), rev'd on other grounds, sub nom. 
Odessa-Montour Cent. Sch. Dist. v. PERB, 228 A.D.2d 892, 29 PERB 1(7009 (3d Dep't 
1996). 
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PERB v. City of Buffalo,^5 upon which the City relies, does not warrant a contrary 
conclusion. There, Supreme Court denied PERB's application for injunctive relief under 
§209-a.4 of the Act. Perceiving the alleged violation to be a refusal to negotiate on 
demand, and finding neither a demand by the union nor an unwillingness to negotiate 
by the City, the Court held that there was no reasonable cause to believe that the City 
violated §209-a.1(d). Here, there is no question that the charge is premised only on a 
unilateral change in existing terms and conditions of employment, not a refusal to 
negotiate on demand. 
The other cases on which the City relies are also inapposite.16 Each involves the 
duty to negotiate concerning the impact that a nonmandatory decision has on terms 
and conditions of employment. Although we have held that the duty to negotiate impact 
arises only on demand, here, the City's decision to subcontract is itself mandatorily 
negotiable. 
The City's second waiver argument is a hybrid of its first. According to the City, 
USWA waived its bargaining rights because it did not seek to negotiate concerning the 
City's decision to subcontract the work after learning of its plans in June or early July 
1996. Again, the City misunderstands its statutory bargaining obligations. 
The party to a bargaining relationship that seeks to change existing terms and 
conditions of employment must obtain that change through collective negotiations. 
1530 PERB 1J7005 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co. 1997). 
™North Babylon Union Free Sch. Dist, 7 PERB fl3027 (1974); County of Chemung, 
18 PERB H4568 (1986); Town of Oyster Bay, 12 PERB 1J4510, aff'd, 12 PERB 
3086(1979). 
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Therefore, just as an employee organization must affirmatively seek to negotiate to 
obtain the change that it desires, so too must a public employer affirmatively seek to 
negotiate to obtain the change that it desires. If either party refuses to negotiate on the 
other's demand, it violates the duty to negotiate under the Act. However, a public 
employer's duty to seek to negotiate concerning a change that it desires is not shifted to 
the employee organization simply by announcing that it is going to implement the 
change. 
In CSEA v. Newman,17the Appellate Division held (citations omitted): 
A waiver is 'the intentional relinquishment of a known right 
with both knowledge of its existence and an intention to 
relinquish it. [Citation omitted] Such a waiver must be clear, 
unmistakable and without ambiguity . . . . [The charging 
party's] failure to demand negotiations may have been 
inexplicable, but it should not be construed as a waiver. 
Simply put, mere inexplicable silence or inaction by an employee organization that has 
been notified of an impending change in terms and conditions of employment does not 
establish a waiver of its bargaining rights. Thus, in Germantown Central School District, 
supra, we held that our prior decisions concerning waiver by silence or inaction remain 
persuasive only to the extent that they are consistent with CSEA v. Newman.18 
1788 A.D.2d 685, 686, 15 PERB1J7011, at 7021-22 (3d Dep't 1982). 
18See Onteora Cent. Sch. Dist, 16 PERB fl3098, at 3164, n. 4 (1983); City of White 
Plains, 13 PERB 1T3059 (1980); State of New York (State Univ. of New York at Albany), 
13 PERB 1J3044 (1980), cont'd in part, annulled in part, sub nom. CSEA v. Newman, 
88 A.D.2d 685, 15 PERB TJ7011 (3d Dep't 1982), appeal dismissed, 57 N.Y.2d 775, 
15 PERB 1T7020 (1982); County of Rensselaer, 8 PERB fl3039 (1975); Schenectady 
County Community College, 6 PERB 1J3027 (1973); State of New York, 6 PERB 1J3005 
(1973). 
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Here, as in CSEA v. Newman, the City argues only that USWA was aware of its 
intentions and that it did not seek to negotiate concerning the decision. At best, such 
circumstances show only an inexplicable failure to demand negotiations. But they do 
not clearly and unambiguously establish that USWA intentionally relinquished its 
bargaining rights regarding the decision to subcontract its exclusive unit work.19 
Therefore, as in Germantown, supra, the City's reliance on County of Rensselaer,20 City 
of White Plains2^ and Onteora Central School District,22 is unpersuasive. Indeed, the 
undisputed facts as found by the ALJ establish that USWA opposed the City's plans to 
privatize the work, and that it consistently tried to convince the City to continue using 
unit employees. Such circumstances are entirely inconsistent with a waiver of 
bargaining rights.23 Therefore, we reject the City's claim that USWA waived its 
bargaining rights. 
Finally, the City claims that it satisfied whatever obligation that it may have had to 
negotiate with USWA concerning its decision to privatize the work. Its argument is 
based on discussions and correspondence between USWA president Soro and various 
City officials. Characterizing those discussions and correspondence as negotiations 
19ln any event, the record does not establish that the City notified USWA that it was 
definitively going to subcontract the work until December 3. Until then, the City's 
communications with USWA express only that it was contemplating such action. 
20 o ~ ±— •< o 
&upia n u i c I U . 
21Si/pranote 18. 
22Supra note 18. 
See Odessa-Montour Cent. Sch. Dist., supra note 14. 
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and invitations to negotiate, the City claims that it satisfied its bargaining obligations 
under the Act. We disagree. 
The ALJ correctly held that the relevant discussions and invitations between the 
City and USWA did not constitute negotiations under the Act. Indeed, the record shows 
that the City merely solicited USWA's comments, along with those of the general public, 
concerning its draft request for proposals, that it solicited bargaining over only the 
impact of its decision to subcontract the work, and that it analyzed USWA's assessment 
of the relative costs of privatizing the work as compared to keeping it in house. These 
events do not constitute collective bargaining. That USWA advocated in favor of 
continuing to use unit employees at meetings of the Common Council while City 
officials advocated for privatization also does not constitute negotiations under the 
Act.24 At best, these events show that the City simply afforded USWA an opportunity to 
dissuade it from privatizing the work and that it was willing to negotiate concerning the 
impact of its decision. Even if we were to assume that these events constituted 
collective bargaining, the City was still not free to act unilaterally under the 
circumstances presented here.25 There is no evidence that the City bargained to 
impasse, that there was a compelling operational need to privatize the work and that it 
was willing to continue bargaining after privatizing the work. 
24See City of Poughkeepsie v. Newman, 95 A.D.2d 101, 16 PERB 1J7021 (3d Dep't 
1983), appeal dismissed, 60 N.Y.2d 859, 16 PERB 1J7027 (1983), leave to appeal 
denied, 62 N.Y.2d 608, 17 PERB ^7009 (1984); Saratoga Springs Sch. Disi, 11 PERB 
1J3037 (1978), cont'd sub nom. Saratoga Springs City Sch. Dist. v. PERB, 68 A.D.2d 
202, 12 PERB H7008 (3d Dep't 1979), leave to appeal denied, 47 N.Y.2d 711, 12 PERB 
117012(1979). 
25See Wappingers Cent. Sch. Dist, 5 PERB 1J3074 (1972) and 19 PERB P037 
(1986); Cohoes City Sch. Dist, 12 PERB 1J3113 (1979). 
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We note that the City took exception to the ALJ's determination that Article 3.1 of 
the City/USWA collective bargaining agreement establishes a contractual waiver.26 
However, the City offers no arguments in support. Nevertheless, whether asserted as a 
waiver, or as evidence that the City satisfied its duty to negotiate under the Act,27 we 
find, as did the ALJ, that the contractual language does not give the City the right to 
privatize unit work.28 
Therefore, we reject the City's argument that it satisfied its duty to negotiate 
under the Act. 
We now turn to the remedy. We find that it is appropriate to modify the ALJ's 
remedial order. First, the ALJ's order did not address the employees who were 
transferred to the City's Street Construction Division as a result of the subcontract with 
Modern Disposal. We order that they be offered reinstatement to their former positions 
under the same terms applicable to the employees who were terminated. Second, the 
ALJ directed the City to restore the prevailing terms and conditions of employment for 
the reinstated employees. We find it appropriate to clarify that the prevailing terms and 
conditions of employment that must be restored are those that existed at the time the 
City transferred or terminated the employees/except to the extent that those terms and 
conditions of employment may have been modified in subsequent negotiations with 
USWA. In all other respects, we adopt the order of the ALJ with the understanding that 
26The text of Article 3.1 is set forth in the ALJ's decision. 
27See County of Nassau (Police Dep't), 31 PERB ^3064 (1998). 
2aCompare County of Livingston, 26 PERB 1J3074 (1993); Town of Greece, 26 PERB 
1J3032 (1993); Sachem Cent. Sch. Dist, 21 PERB H3021 (1988). 
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the make-whole order encompasses such offsets for earnings denied as a result of the 
employees' loss of employment or unemployment insurance benefits received, as 
appropriate. As modified, we direct the City to sign and post the attached notice at all 
locations customarily used to post notices of information to unit employees. 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED: December 10, 1998 
Albany, New York _^ ^—^ 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
4\4 
Marc A: Abbott, Member 
•NIOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees represented by the United Steelworkers of America, Local Union 15315 (USWA) that 
the City of Niagara Falls will: 
1. Restore the work of the collection and disposal of residential and commercial garbage and bulk refuse 
to the employees in the unit represented by USWA. 
2. Offer all employees who were terminated or transferred as a result of the City's subcontract with Modern 
Disposal Services, Inc. reinstatement to their former positions under the prevailing terms and conditions 
of employment as they existed when the subcontract was entered, except to the extent those prevailing 
terms and conditions of employment may have been modified in subsequent negotiations with USWA. 
3. Make each such employee whole for any wages and benefits lost as a result of the subcontract with 
Modern Disposal Services, Inc. from the date of termination or transfer to the effective date of their 
reinstatement, with interest at the currently prevailing, maximum legal rate. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
CITY OF NIAGARA FALLS 
v
 .-.iis Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING 
ENGINEERS, LOCAL 545, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-4642 
COUNTY OF ONEIDA, 
Employer, 
-and -
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION 
LOCAL 424, A DIVISION OF UNITED INDUSTRY 
WORKERS DISTRICT COUNCIL 424, 
Intervenor. 
BLITMAN & KING LLP (CHARLES E. BLITMAN and CHARLES C. SPAGNOLl 
of counsel), for Petitioner 
HANCOCK & ESTABROOK, LLP (JOHN F. CORCORAN of counsel), for 
Employer 
RICHARD M. GREENSPAN, P.C. (RICHARD M. GREENSPAN of counsel) 
for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case is before us pursuant to exceptions filed by the International Union of 
Operating Engineers, Local 545, AFL-CIO (Local 545) to a decision by the Director of 
Board - C-4642 -2 
Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director). Local 545 has petitioned 
to represent a unit of County of Oneida (County) employees currently represented by 
the United Public Service Employees Union Local 424, A Division of United Industry 
Workers District Council 424 (UPSEU). 
In response to the petition, UPSEU alleged that Local 545 is not an employee 
organization within the meaning of §201.5 of the Public Employees' Fair Employment 
Act (Act). The County has not taken any position on that issue. After a hearing, the 
Director held that Local 545 is not an employee organization as defined because its by-
laws and the International's constitution denied County employees an "assurance" that 
they alone would control their contract negotiations and ratification. In dicta, the 
Director also suggested that provisions in the International's constitution, which binds 
Local 545, might prevent Local 545 from having the autonomy needed to function as a 
certified bargaining agent.1 
By letter dated December 8, 1998, Local 545 has requested that we not hear 
argument or decide its exceptions at this date. Local 545 represents that there have 
been material changes in its by-laws sufficient to remove any question as to its status 
as employee organization. Moreover, it requests that it be afforded an opportunity to 
submit evidence relating to the Director's articulated concerns regarding its relationship 
with the International. UPSEU and the County have consented to the request made by 
Local 545. 
1
 United Public Service Employees Union Local 424, 27 PERB fi3053 (1995). 
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The case is, accordingly, remanded to the Director for further investigation, 
including the receipt of new or additional evidence relevant to Local 545's status as an 
employee organization. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: December 10, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
) STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ELLICOTTVILLE SCHOOL-RELATED PERSONNEL 
UNITED, NYSUT, 
Petitioner, 
- a n d - GASENQG-4812 
ELLICOTTVILLE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
ERNEST HAND, JR., for Petitioner 
LINDA QUICK, ESQ., for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On September 10, 1998, the Ellicottville School-Related Personnel United, 
NYSUT (petitioner) filed, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Public 
Employment Relations Board, a timely petition seeking certification as the exclusive 
representative of certain employees of the Ellicottville Central School District 
(employer). 
Thereafter, the parties executed a consent agreement in which they stipulated 
that the following negotiating unit was appropriate: 
Included: All support personnel including but not limited to: 
Teacher aide, typist, library aide, aide (special education), office 
worker, office clerk, receptionist, cook manager, food service 
helper, school lunch cook, cashier, bus driver, school bus 
mechanic, auto mechanic, cleaner, building & grounds, 
maintenance worker, substitute cleaner. 
Excluded: Teaching assistants, school nurse, superintendent's secretary. 
Case No. C-4812 - 2 -
Pursuant to that agreement, a secret-ballot election was held on November 13, 
1998, at which a majority of ballots were cast against representation by the petitioner. 
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a majority of the eligible 
voters in the unit who cast ballots do not desire to be represented for the purpose of 
collective bargaining by the petitioner, IT IS ORDERED that the petition should be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: December 10, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
OFFICE AND PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEES 
INTERNATIONAL UNION, LOCAL 212, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4744 
CITY OF NORTH TONAWANDA, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Office and Professional Employees 
International Union, Local 212, has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit found to be appropriate 
and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-4744 page 2 
Unit: Included: City Accountant, Assessor, Building Inspector, Code 
Enforcement/Plumbing Inspector, Public Works Superintendent, 
Assistant Public Works Superintendent, Waste Water Treatment 
Plant Superintendent, Director of Youth, Recreation and Parks, 
City Clerk, City Engineer, Director of Emergency services (Civil 
Defense Director), Water Treatment Plant Superintendent. 
Excluded: All others. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Office and Professional Employees International Union, 
Local 212. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating 
any agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: December 10, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
